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PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulo8*
COMMON, PUBLIC, AND PRIVATE THINGS
According to Louisiana legislation embodying a strong
public policy, the beds or bottoms of navigable waters are
things of the public domain insusceptible of private owner-
ship.' However, according to California Company v. Price,2
certain state patents conveying navigable water bottoms to
private persons were unassailable upon the lapse of six years
from the date of their issuance by application of Act 62 of
1912.3 This ill-starred decision, resting on an inverted
pyramid of authority 4 gave rise to strong criticism from the
judiciary, the legislature, and doctrinal writers.5 It finally has
been overruled by Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board,8 a
landmark decision discussed in detail elsewhere in this Re-
view. 7 It suffices to state here that the opinion is one of the
last authored by a brilliant and scholarly judge who contrib-
uted greatly to the renaissance of the civilian tradition in
Louisiana. The law is now clear: state patents conveying
navigable water bottoms to private persons are absolute nul-
lities, and, to that extent, they may not be cured by the
repose statute of 1912. Justice Barham's opinion is supported
by rigorously logical reasoning and exhaustive research; it is
a model of civilian methodology.
In an effort at conservation of natural resources, the
Louisiana legislature has enacted a series of statutes declar-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9:110 (1950); LA. R.S. 49:3 (1950). See A. YIAN-
NOPOULOS, PROPERTY in 2 LOUISIANA CIL LAW TREATISE §§ 23, 30, 32 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as PROPERTY].
2. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954). For antecedents, see Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839 (1953); O'Brien v.
State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1946); Realty Operators, Inc.
v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942); State v. Sweet Lake
Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927).
3. See La. Acts 1912, No. 62, now LA. Rt.S. 9:5661 (1950).
4. See Carter v. Moore, 258 La. 921, 962, 248 So. 2d 813, 827 (1971)
(Barham, J., concurring).
5. For detailed discussion, see Yiannopoulos, Validity of Patents Convey-
ing Navigable Water Bottoms-Act 62 of 1912, Price, Carter, and All That,
32 LA. L. REV. 1 (1971).
6. 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975).
7. See Note, 36 LA. L. REV. 694 (1976).
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ing that the state owns various species of wildlife.8 Upon close
scrutiny, this so-called ownership appears to be more in the
nature of imperium rather than dominium.9 In Leger v. Loui-
siana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,10 a farmer
brought suit against the Department on account of damage to
his potato crop caused by wild deer. He claimed, inter alia,
that the Department was liable to him under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2321 as owner of the animals that caused the
damage. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a judg-
ment sustaining the Department's exception of no cause of
action. In a well-considered and scholarly opinion, Judge
Hood pointed out that the state owns wildlife merely in a
sovereign capacity; hence, in the absence of private owner-
ship of animals, article 2321 had no application. The result is,
of course, correct. Nevertheless, the plight of the farmer who
may not protect his crops by shooting the deer is quite real,
and perhaps the legislature should consider appropriate rem-
edies."
Public property, namely, property of the state and of its
political subdivisions, may be either property of the public
domain or property of the private domain. Classification car-
ries significant practical consequences. In Wright v. Sabine
River Authority,12 the court correctly classified strips of high
land abutting the Toledo Bend Dam Reservoir as property of
the private domain. Accordingly, the Sabine River Authority
had the right to lease this property to private persons and to
levy fees for the privilege of using that property for commer-
cial purposes.
Roads and streets dedicated to public use are things of
the public domain. Depending on the mode of dedication, the
public may own the soil or merely hold a servitude. 13 In Her-
8. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 56:101-39, 251-76, 421-49 (195). See PROPERTY § 38, text
at note 262 (1966).
9. Cf. Pound, The End of the Law, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 234 (1914).
10. 306 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
11. Cf. Wagner, Recent Developments in State Tort Liability in Poland, 20
AM. J. COMP. L. 247, 261-62 (1972): "An instance of state liability, unknown in
most other countries, is provided by art. 42 of the law on wild animals and
hunting of 1959, which imposes strict liability in certain situations for dam-
age to crops by boars, elks, and fallow deer. This rule of state liability was
enacted along with proclamatioti of state ownership of wild animals, which
prior to 1959 were considered res nullius."
12. 308 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 245
(1975).
13. See PROPERTY §§ 33, 35 (Supp. 1975).
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litz v. City of Baton Rouge,1 4 the court found that a street in
downtown Baton Rouge was owned by the public by virtue of
an 1806 dedication. In a meticulous opinion, Judge Sartain
pointed out that there was sufficient evidence in the record to
sustain a finding that the subdivider in 1806 intended to con-
vey the ownership of the street to the public. He bolstered his
conclusion with the assertion that "prior to 1825, any dedica-
tion would vest full title in the city. ' 15
Privately owned artificial canals are not subject to public
use merely because they are navigable.' 6 In National Audu-
bon Society v. White, 17 the question arose whether a private
landowner may restrict or prohibit the use by others of a
navigable canal constructed by him on his own property.
After exhaustive analysis of the evidence and of the pertinent
legal provision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that
the owner of the canal had the right to regulate its use in the
same way as the owner of a private road. The court answered
defendant's argument that the Louisiana Criminal Code pro-
hibits the obstruction of all navigable waterways 8 with the
assertion that the criminal statute may not constitutionally
be applied to a private canal. Judge Hood distinguished Dis-
con v. Sarray, Inc.,19 on the ground that it involved a dedi-
cated right of way, which might well be the underlying as-
sumption in that case. 20 The Louisiana Supreme Court rightly
refused writs.21 When the appropriate occasion arises, how-
ever, the supreme court should clarify the ambiguities of
dicta in the Sarray decision.
Louisiana Civil Code article 861 provides that local citi-
zens of full age have the right to sue for the destruction of
works that "obstruct or embarrass" the use of property of the
public domain. Giardina v. Marrero Furniture Co. 22 required
interpretation of this provision. A landowner brought suit
against the Department of Highways and one of his com-
14. 298 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
15. But cf. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Property, 34 LA. L. REV. 207, 207 (1974).
16. See PROPERTY § 31.5 (Supp. 1975).
17. 302 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
18. LA. R.S. 14:97 (1950).
19. 262 La. 997, 265 So. 2d 765 (1972).
20. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Property, 33 LA. L. REV. 172, 172-175 (1973).
21. 305 So. 2d 542 (La. 1975).
22. 310 So. 2d 607 (La. 1975).
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petitors in the furniture business, seeking the removal of an
advertising sign directing motorists to defendant's store, lo-
cated on the highway right of way in front of plaintiffs prop-
erty. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that
plaintiff failed to show "immediate and irreparable injury,"
and the court of appeal affirmed. The Louisiana Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgments of the
courts below as to Marrero Furniture Company.
In a well-reasoned opinion, richly documented by legisla-
tion, jurisprudence, and doctrine, Justice Dixon correctly
pointed out that article 861 contemplates injunctive relief
without the limitations of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 3601; hence, in cases governed by article 861 of the
Civil Code the party requesting injunctive relief need not
show immediate and irreparable injury. The court conceded
that the advertising sign in question did not obstruct the use
of the highway but found that it "embarrassed" the public way
within the meaning of the legislative text.23 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the district court for the formation and
rendition of a judgment awarding the appropriate injunctive
relief. Justice Barham concurred, pointing out that injunctive
relief under the circumstances was properly available under
Louisiana Civil Code article 667 because the defendant had
abused his right of ownership. His reasoning would have ren-
dered unnecessary the majority's effort at a literal and
perhaps tenuous interpretation of the words "embarrass the
use" in article 861. Indeed, an examination of the French text
of the Civil Code indicates that the words genent l'usage pref-
erably should be translated as "impede or some such word in
the English language which is a modification of total obstruc-
tion."24
MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
In Benoit v. Acadia Fuel & Oil Distributors, Inc.,25 plain-
tiff sued Gulf Oil Corporation for damages on account of the
removal of an H-frame lift, an air compressor used for the
operation of the lift, and three electric gasoline pumps from
his property. The equipment belonged to Gulf, which had
placed it on the premises in accordance with an unrecorded
23. Id. at 612-613.
24. Id. at 614 (Barham, J., concurring).
25. 315 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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agreement with one Cleveland, plaintiffs ancestor in title.
When plaintiff purchased the property "with buildings and
improvements" nothing was said about Gulf's equipment. A
few weeks later Gulf removed the equipment and the suit
followed. Plaintiff claimed that he acquired the ownership of
the lift, air compressor, and pumps as immovables by nature
by accession. Taking into account the size, degree of integra-
tion with the soil, and permanence of the works, the court
concluded that the H-frame lift was an immovable by nature
as a "construction" under article 464; thus, plaintiff was its
owner and had a claim for its value against Gulf. The court
pointed out that the unrecorded agreement between Gulf and
Cleveland had no effect on Benoit, even if he knew of it.
The court found that the air compressor was a movable
that Gulf had the right to remove from the premises. It was
not a component part of the lift, nor did it meet the tests for
immobilization under either article 464 or article 467. In
reaching its conclusion, the court correctly accounted for
practical considerations, noting that conceptual abstractions
alone may "lead to consequences beyond the bounds of
reason. '26 The question of the classification of the gasoline
pumps was not before the court on appeal. The court finally
concluded that Gulf had a right of recourse against Cleveland,
plaintiffs ancestor in title, under Louisiana Civil Code article
508 for reimbursement of the value and price of workmanship
of the lift. One may have good reasons to disagree with. the
holding, as Judge Frug6 did, because Gulf was not a "posses-
sor" within the meaning of article 508. Nevertheless, it is
supported by Louisiana jurisprudence. 27 Under the cir-
cumstances, it might have been preferable to accord Gulf a
contractual remedy against Cleveland.
PREDIAL SERVITUDES
Natural Servitudes
Until the Louisiana legislature enacts comprehensive
water and drainage legislation, courts will continue to strug-
gle for solutions under the scant provisions of the Civil Code
pertaining to natural servitudes. 28 In Wood v. Gibson Con-
26. Id. at 847.
27. See Comment, Artificial Accession to Immovables, 28 LA. L.
REV. 584, 596 (1968).
28. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 660-61; Pickett v. Taylor, 316 So. 2d 778 (La.
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struction Co.,29 a landowner brought suit against a subdivi-
sion developer, owner of adjacent property, seeking injunc-
tive relief for the prevention of unnatural drainage into his
property. Plaintiff's property was the lower estate burdened
with a natural servitude of drain in favor of defendant's
upper estate, but defendant's clearing, grading, and building
operations had resulted in a more rapid and channelized flow
of water. Heavy rainfall caused plaintiffs property to flood.
The court refused to grant injunctive relief on the ground
that plaintiff had failed to prove a threat of irreparable in-
jury, loss, or damage, as required by Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 3601.30 The result might perhaps be jus-
tified on the basis of a finding that plaintiff had the substan-
tive right to develop his land as he did. But it is erroneous to
condition the availability of injunctive relief under article 660
on satisfaction of the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure
article 3601. In Poole v. Guste,31 the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared that servitudes may be enforced in Louisiana by
mandatory and prohibitory injunctions without regard to the
historical limitations developed by the chancery court. In the
light of Louisiana's different civilian procedural background,
an injunction lies even if damages are an adequate remedy,
because "injunction has historically been recognized as a rem-
edy available to protect possession of property ... including
... the continued use of a servitude of drain over another's
land., 32
Legal Servitudes
The matters of proper interpretation and application of
articles 667-669 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 continue to
give rise to impressive judicial gloss. 33 In Hero Lands Co. v.
App. 3d Cir. 1975) (action for damages on account of the alteration of natural
flow of waters and for the removal of levee structures); Maddox v. Louisiana
Industries, Inc., 311 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (action for injunction to
restore the natural flow of waters and damages).
29. 313 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
30. See also Moreland v. Acadian Mobile Homes Park, Inc., 313 So. 2d 877
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
31. 261 La. 1110, 262 So. 2d 339 (1972).
32. Id. at 1126-27, 262 So. 2d at 345.
33. See Carr v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975)
(city liable without negligence for damage to private property caused by
back-up of sewer effluent); Smith v. Jackson Parish School Bd., 300 So. 2d 252
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1974) (school board liable for damage to neighbor's pond
caused by defective sewerage system). For liability under article 667 there
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Texaco, Inc.,34 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the
existence of a novel cause of action under Louisiana Civil
Code articles 667 and 2315 for the diminution of the value of
neighboring property even in the absence of a physical inva-
sion. The writer's involvement in this litigation precludes
further comments.
In Merco Lands, Inc. v. Hutchinson,35  a landowner
brought suit to enjoin the construction of an oxidation pond
on neighboring property near his boundary. He contended
that since a regulation of the Louisiana State Board of
Health prohibited the location of water wells within 50 feet of
an oxidation pond, the construction of the pond near the
boundary would deprive him of the use of a portion of his
property for water wells that he planned to drill. After a
careful analysis of the facts and of pertinent legislation, ju-
risprudence, and doctrine, Judge Culpepper concluded that
plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief under both Louisi-
ana Code of Civil Procedure article 3601 and Louisiana Civil
Code article 667. Plaintiff had proven the threat of irrepara-
ble harm; moreover, "if Article 667 does establish a servitude,
which is a real right, the plaintiff, as owner of that real right,
is entitled to protection by injunction. ' 36 The case illustrates
the proposition that article 667 contemplates civil responsibil-
ity toward neighbors for abnormal uses of property, if not for
abuse of the right of ownership. 37 One may wonder whether
must be causal connection between the damage and the acts or works on
neighboring property. Butler v. Cargill, Inc., 304 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974) (soybean dust was not the cause of plaintiff's asthmatic seizure);
Templin v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974)
(accumulation of lint was not the cause of plaintiff's fall). Further, it has been
held that the loss sustained by plaintiff must be "the natural and anticipated
consequence" of acts, works, or activities on neighboring property. Holland v.
Keaveney, 306 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (death of neighbor's rare dog
caused by bees swarming from the site of a demolition; no liability under
article 667). Finally, the plaintiff must be included in the class of persons
protected by article 667. See Wright v. Travelers Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 374 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974) (landowner not liable under article 667 to bicyclist who
was injured in a collision in front of the property, although the accident was
attributed in part to overgrown weeds that had obscured visibility).
34. 310 So. 2d 93 (La. 1975). See Note, 36 LA. L. REV. 711 (1976).
35. 306 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 859. Of course, injunction will not lie if there is proof at the trial
that the situation has been corrected. Smith v. Jackson Parish School Bd.,
300 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
37. See 2 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 188 (5th ed. 1967); Mayrand, Abuse
of Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 993 (1974).
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the result would be the same if, mutatis mutandis, plaintiff
had sought to enjoin the drilling of water wells near his
boundary on the ground that he would thereby be deprived of
the use of a portion of his property for the location of an
oxidation pond that he intended to construct.
The question of the classification of the cause of action
under article 667 of the Civil Code remains unresolved. Clas-
sification carries practical consequences, including the
applicable period of prescription. In Mut v. Newark Ins. Co.,38
the First Circuit Court of Appeal declared that the action
under article 667 "is in tort,"39 whereas in Moreland v. Aca-
dian Mobile Homes Park, Inc.40 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal indicated that such an action is not in tort. In Dean v.
Hercules, Inc.,4 1 the first circuit, in a scholarly opinion by
Judge Ellis, and an elaborate concurrence by Judge Barnette,
repudiated its earlier view and held that because the action
under article 667 is not delictual, the governing prescription
is that of article 3544 rather than that of article 3536 of the
Civil Code. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari 42
and, for this reason, further comments are withheld.
The right of passage of an enclosed estate is a legal ser-
vitude. In Collins v. Reed,43 the court undertook to interpret
article 699, as amended, to determine the conditions under
which an estate is enclosed. Judge Domengeaux correctly
pointed out that an estate may be enclosed although it has
access to a railroad track. The road contemplated by article
699 is, indeed, one by which "ingress and egress might be
effected, i.e., a passage capable of carrying vehicular traffic."' '
In Ramsey v. Johnson,45 the district court ordered the reloca-
tion of an existing driveway that connected an admittedly
enclosed estate with a public road. The court of appeal
affirmed on the ground that the result was reasonable and in
accord with Louisiana Civil Code article 703. Under the cir-
cumstances one should properly speak of the location of the
right of passage rather than its relocation, because the record
38. 289 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 245.
40. 313 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
41. 314 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
42. 317 So. 2d 55 (La. 1975).
43. 316 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 138.
45. 312 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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did not show that a right of passage had ever been fixed by
the court or by agreement of the parties.46
Conventional Servitudes
Conventional servitudes are real rights established on an
estate in favor of another estate by juridical act 4 7 destination
of the owner, or acquisitive prescription." They may be con-
tinuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent. Clas-
sification carries practical consequences concerning modes of
acquisition, termination, and protection of servitudes by real
actions. 49 In Nash v. Whitten,50 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the presence of a visible pipeline for the
transportation of natural gas during a period in excess of ten
years gave rise to a servitude by prescription. The holding,
predicated on a determination that the pipeline servitude in
question was continuous and apparent, is supported by juris-
prudence and doctrine.51 The Louisiana Supreme Court
granted certiorari, 52 perhaps because it wishes to re-examine
the basis of the distinction of servitudes into continuous and
discontinuous and .the matter of prescription in the light of
conflicting determinations by lower courts. Indeed, in Gilfoil
v. Greenspon,53 Justice Dixon, then at the second circuit, de-
clared that a real right for the transportation of hydrocar-
bons by a pipeline constituted an apparent and discontinuous
servitude, terminable by nonuse.
REAL ACTIONS
The Possessory Action
The possessory action is available to one who has been
disturbed in his possession of an immovable or in his quasi-
46. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Property, 32 LA. L. REV. 172, 183 n.54 (1972).
47. Hymel v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Bd., 303 So. 2d 588 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974); South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Dempster, 303 So. 2d
280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
48. See Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110 n.5, 262 So. 2d 339, 342 n.5 (1972);
Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; Creation by Title: Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 45 TUL. L. REV. 459, 461 (1971).
49. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1968).
50. 312 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
51. See Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Broussard, 175 So. 2d 856
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
52. 317 So. 2d 624 (La. 1975).
53. 216 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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possession of a real right in immovable property.54 The dis-
turbance may be one in fact or in law. To maintain the pos-
sessory action, a possessor must allege and prove, inter alia,
that he has had possession at the time the disturbance oc-
curred and that he and his ancestors in title had such posses-
sion "quietly and without interruption for more than a year
immediately prior to the disturbance. . . -55 In Liner v. Loui-
siana Land & Exploration Co., 56 the Louisiana Supreme
Court infused life into these procedural requirements. The
court found as a fact that Liner had been in possession of the
property since 1909 and that he had been disturbed in his
possession by numerous acts of the defendant over the years
but never evicted. The court thus recognized the distinction,
founded in the Civil Code and in the Code of Civil Procedure,
between a disturbance of possession that results in eviction
and one that falls short of eviction. 57 If a possessor is evicted,
the person who causes the eviction ordinarily commences to
possess for himself. The evicted possessor, however, has one
year from the date of dispossession to .bring the possessory
action in order to be "restored" in his possession.58 If he has
merely been disturbed but not evicted, he has one year from
the date of the disturbance to bring the possessory action
in order to be "maintained in his possession. ' 59 In the case
under consideration, since Liner alleged and proved posses-
sion at the time of the disturbance, successful conclusion of
his action depended on satisfaction of the requirements of
quiet and uninterrupted possession for a year prior to the
disturbance. The court held that since Liner's possession, not
commenced by violence, was quiet, and since Liner had not
been evicted for more than a year prior to the disturbance,
his possession had been uninterrupted. On application for
rehearing, the judgment was affirmed in a terse per curiam
opinion. Justice Tate, concurring, furnished additional doctri-
nal documentation designed to harmonize procedural rules
54. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3658. The possession protected by this article is
"corporeal possession or civil possession preceded by corporeal possession."
Causeway Land Co. v. Karno, 317 So. 2d 661, 663 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). A
merely precarious possession is not protected by the possessory action. Beni-
nate v. Bodenger, 315 So. 2d 372 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
55. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3658.
56. 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975).
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3454(2); LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3659.
58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3454(2); LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3655, 3658(4).
59. Id.
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with the substantive provisions of the Civil Code governing
possession.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3658(2), derived
from article 49(2) of the Code of Practice of 1870, "makes no
change in the law."'60 It seems that the redactors of the Code
of Practice and of the Code of Civil Procedure used the words
"without interruption" to convey the same idea as in Louisi-
ana Civil Code article 3454(2), namely, that possessory protec-
tion is available to every person "who has possessed an estate
for a year, or enjoys peaceably and without interruption a real
right, and is disturbed in it. ' '61 Article 3658(2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure thus declares, in harmony with the substan-
tive rules of the Civil Code, that possessory protection is
available to one who has acquired the right to possess by
virtue of the peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the
estate for a period of one year.6 2 Physical control alone, with-
out the right to possess, does not give rise to possessory
protection in the Louisiana system, except in the case of
eviction of the possessor by force or fraud. This limited pro-
tection is given to preserve peace in society and as a deter-
rent against self-help. In a technical sense, therefore, the
action for the recovery of possession against a person who
evicted another by force or fraud is not a possessory action.6
According to article 3658(2) of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, possessory protection is not available to one who
has acquired the right to possess but whose possession was
interrupted in the year immediately preceding the distur-
bance. Neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Civil Procedure
determines what constitutes interruption of possession for the
60. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3658, comment by the redactors.
61. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3655.
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3454(2); La. Civ. Code art. 3417(2) (1825). The
provision reflects language used in La. Digest of 1808, ch. III, sec. I, art. 23,
taken almost verbatim from the text of Pothier. See 9 CEUVRES DE POTHIER
291 (ed. Bugnet 1861). There is no corresponding provision in the Napoleonic
Code. In drafting La. Digest of 1808, art. 23, the redactors were aware of La.
Digest of 1808, art. 38, corresponding with Code Napoleon art. 2229 which
declared: "Prescription requires a continued, uninterrupted, peaceable, pub-
lic and unequivocal possession; it is also required that the person claiming
the prescription shall have possessed animo Domini, that is, as master or
proprietor" (transl. by author). This provision was amended in 1825, and
eventually became LA. CIV. CODE art. 3487.
63. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3449(2), 3454(2), 3456 (1870). See 3 M. PLANIOL
ET G. RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS 794 (2d ed. Picard
1952); PROPERTY § 132 (1966).
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purposes of the possessory action. Article 3517 of the Civil
Code, however, declares that acquisitive prescription is inter-
rupted "when the possessor is deprived of the possession of
the thing during more than a year, either by the ancient
proprietor or even by a third person." A question thus arises
whether the same rule ought to apply to interruption of pos-
session or whether possession is interrupted merely upon the
loss of physical control.6 5
Clearly possession is interrupted not when it is merely
disturbed but rather when it is lost.6 6 Possession may be lost
with or without the consent of the possessor. According to
Louisiana Civil Code article 3449,67 possession is lost against
the consent of the possessor:
1. When another expels him from it, whether by force in
driving him away, or by usurping possession during his
absence, and preventing him from re-entering.
2. When a possessor of an estate allows it to be usurped
and held for a year, without, during that time, having
done any act of possession, or interfered with the
usurper's possession.
The second paragraph of the article is closely related to arti-
cle 3456 of the Civil Code, which declares that if the possessor
"leaves the person evicting him in possession for one year,
without complaint, he shall lose his possession, whatever ap-
parent right he may have to it, and shall be driven to an
action for the ownership of the property."6 8
64. LA. Crv. CODE art. 3517. Note the error in the English translation.
"Possession" should be "enjoyment." 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL
CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 3517 (J. Dainow ed.).
65. In France, in the absence of a provision corresponding to LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3443, commentators indicate that possession is not lost upon evic-
tion but upon the lapse of one year from eviction. This conclusion is based on
FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2243 which corresponds to LA. CIV. CODE art. 3517,
dealing with interruption of acquisitive prescription. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU,
DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS 124 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
66. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]i PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
qAIS 170 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
67. The provision was first adopted in 1825. It derives verbatim from the
text of Pothier. See 9 (EUVRES DE POTHIER 289 (ed. Bugnet 1961); Batiza,
The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General Analytical
Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 111 (1972). There is no corresponding provision in
the Napoleonic Code.
68. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3456 first appeared as La. Digest of 1808, ch. III,
sec. I, art. 27, having been derived verbatim from the text of Domat. See 2
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Article 3449 establishes two distinct modes rather than
two cumulative requirements for loss of possession. s If pos-
session is lost under the first paragraph of article 3449 upon
eviction of the possessor, the second paragraph would be
superfluous. It seems that the redactors of the Louisiana
Civil Code, following Pothier, had in mind two distinct mat-
ters: loss of possession as physical control, article 3449(1), and
loss of the right to possess, articles 3449(2), 3456. This interpre-
tation recognizes the fact that the Civil Code uses the word
"'possession" at times to denote physical control and at times
to denote the right to possess. 70
A question remains whether article 3658(2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure contemplates a loss of possession by eviction
of any duration or only by an eviction that has lasted for
more than a year. In other words, does this provision con-
template interruption of possession by the loss of physical
control or does it envision interruption of possession by the
loss of the right to possess? If possession is interrupted within
the meaning of article 3658(2) by the mere loss of physical
control, the possessor must allege and prove that he was not
evicted at all during the period of one year immediately pre-
ceding the disturbance. If, on the other hand, possession is
interrupted within the meaning of article 3658(2) by the loss
of the right to possess, the possessor must merely allege and
prove that he was not evicted and did not stay out of posses-
sion for one year during the one year period immediately
preceding the disturbance. If he was evicted, at any time, for
less than a year and recovered possession prior to the time of
disturbance, he may bring the possessory action. If he was
evicted for a period longer than a year but recovered posses-
sion more than one year immediately preceding the distur-
bance, he may still bring the possessory action. Only if he
tEUVRES DE DOMAT 195 (ed. Remy 1929); Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of
1808: The Actual Sources of Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 1, 131 (1971).
69. Pothier, from whose text the provision derives, having said that "we
lost the possession of an estate against our consent, when somebody evicts
us," goes on to say in a new paragraph that "a second manner whereby we
lose the possession of an estate against our consent is when we allow some-
body to usurp it, who takes possession of it, and enjoys it for a year and a day,
without us having made during this time any act of possession." 9 R.
POTHIER, (EUVRES DE POTHIER 289 (ed. Bugnet 1861).
70. For example, the word "possession" in LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3426-31,
3436-38 means physical control over a thing that one has acquired with the
intent to own it. Possession or physical control leads to acquisitive prescrip-
tion if it has the attributes required by LA. CIV. CODE art. 3487.
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recovered possession during the period of one year im-
mediately preceding the disturbance after having been out of
possession for longer than one year, namely, if he was evicted
at least two years prior to the disturbance and his eviction
lasted for more than a year, is he precluded from bringing the
possessory action.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that the
second interpretation is preferable. Under the court's in-
terpretation, an interruption of possession for purposes of the
possessory action coincides with an interruption of acquisitive
prescription under Louisiana Civil Code article 3517.
Moreover, the loss of the right to possess under article 3449(2)
coincides in time with the acquisition of the right to possess
by another under articles 3454(2) and 3456. Finally, this in-
terpretation accords with French doctrine and jurisprudence
elaborating on corresponding legislative texts71 and with the ap-
parent intent of the redactors of the Louisiana Codes of Prac-
tice and Civil Procedure. The redactors intended to accord
possessory protection to a person who acquired the right to
possess under articles 3449(2), 3454(2), and 3487 of the Civil
Code. And by the provisions of articles 49(2) of the Code of
Practice and 3658(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, they
meant to say that possessory protection is available to any
one who has previously acquired the right to possess and did
not lose it in the year immediately preceding the disturbance.
They did not intend to require that the plaintiff in the posses-
sory action should allege and prove that he acquired the right
to possess in the year immediately prior to the disturbance.
The Petitory Action
The petitory action is one "brought by a person who
claims the ownership, but who is not in possession, of immov-
71. FRENCH CODE Civ. P. art. 23 declares that "possessory actions are
admissible if brought within one year from the disturbance, by those who,
since at least one year, were in peaceable possession by themselves or
through others, by a nonprecarious title" (transl. by author). Aubry and Rau
observe that article 23 does not give a complete enumeration of require-
ments, and, therefore, it must be applied in combination with FRENCH CIV.
CODE art. 2229. The authors observe that the requirements for acquisition of
possession need not exist in the year immediately prior to the disturbance. 2
AUBREY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN3AIS 211 (7th ed. Esmein 1961). Possessory
protection is thus available in France, unless possession was lost by interrup-
tion for a period in excess of one year prior to the disturbance. 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT 170 (2d ed. 1952).
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able property or of a real right, against another who is in
possession or who claims the ownership thereof adversely, to
obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiffs ownership." 72
When the defendant is in possession, plaintiffs burden of
proof is to "make out his title, ' 73 namely, to prove his acquisi-
tion of the ownership of the property or of the real right he
asserts either by an unbroken series of valid transfers from
the original owner or by acquisitive prescription.
In Clayton v. Langston,74 plaintiff sought recognition of
his ownership by virtue of a recorded title; the defendant
answered alleging ownership of the property, both by re-
corded title and by the acquisitive prescription of ten years.
But defendant did not pray for recognition of his ownership.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that plaintiff carried
his burden of proof by tracing a valid record title to a common
ancestor. The court thus re-affirmed its earlier position that
when "both plaintiff and defendant trace their titles to a
common author, plaintiff is not required to prove his title
beyond the common author."75 At that point the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant. The court found that defen-
dant's recorded title was forged; nevertheless, defendant suc-
cessfully established his ownership by the acquisitive pre-
scription of ten years. Although defendant did not pray for
recognition of his ownership, the court, relying on article 862
of the Code of Civil Procedure, affirmed the trial court's
judgment recognizing defendant's ownership of the property.
Stressing the fact that defendant would have been clearly
entitled to such a judgment had he prayed for it, the court
said: "We find no special rule of the real actions to prevent
granting defendant this relief. To hold otherwise, would mean
that if the defendant desires to have his ownership recog-
nized, as against this plaintiff in this suit, he would have to
file a separate action of some type, causing needless delay and
expense. ' 76 One might be inclined to agree with the court's
reasoning, although it tends to blur the distinction between an
answer to a petitory action and a reconventional demand. A
court may resort to article 862 for the limited purpose of
72. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3651.
73. Id. art. 3653(a); PROPERTY § 137.
74. 311 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
75. Id. at 77, quoting from Deselle v. Bonnettee, 251 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971).
76. 311 So. 2d at 80.
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granting judgment recognizing plaintiffs' or defendants'
ownership of the property in a petitory action if, through
inadvertence, the successful litigant failed to pray for this
relief. In other circumstances, however, courts should be
aware of the profound differences in the structure of the
possessory and of the petitory action, the prohibition of cumu-
lation of the two, and the form of relief that is appropriate
under each.
